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Abstract 
The intersection of the standard altruism hypothesis with the quite strong evidence that 
bequests tend to be equal suggests that inter-vivos transfers should be strongly 
compensatory. Yet the available evidence is not in congruence with this implication. It has 
therefore been inferred that the motive underlying inter-vivos transfers is not parental 
altruism. In this paper we present an argument showing why parents who are equally 
altruistic toward their children optimally transfer more to the child whose earnings are higher. 
We show that rather than being orthogonal to parental altruism, counter-compensating 
transfers emanate from such altruism. A key point in the analysis is that parents and children 
are interlinked in a rich web of (vertical and possibly horizontal) transfers, reverse transfers, 
direct transfers, and indirect transfers. 
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1. Introduction 
 Parents are inherently altruistic toward their children. Indeed, parenthood and altruism 
are intimately intertwined, and it is not possible to bear and rear children nonaltruistically. If, to 
begin with, we assume that the parents hold and control the entire quantity of the consumption 
good, altruistic parents must transfer some of the good to their child(ren). The altruism weight 
attached to the wellbeing of the child determines the size of the transfer. In general, parents can 
give to their children using inter-vivos transfers and bequests. 
 
 When parents have two or more children who are not identical in all relevant respects, 
the main question of interest is what determines the division of parental giving across children. 
The auxiliary assumption that altruistic parents are equally altruistic toward their children leads 
to a theoretical prediction that a child who is less “well off” will receive more than a child who 
is “better off”. If wellbeing is measured by earnings, the prediction is that more will be given to 
the child who earns less (Becker and Tomes, 1979). The available evidence is, however, not 
easily reconcilable with this prediction. 
  
 When we examine the distribution of bequests, it appears that parents typically divide 
their estate equally among their children. Menchik (1980, 1988) finds that in the division of 
large estates in Connecticut (1930-1945), equal bequests predominated. Similarly, an 
examination of wills in Cleveland, Ohio (1964-1965), shows that about 80 percent of siblings 
shared the estate equally. Wilhelm (1996) finds that in the U.S. (1982), 68.6 percent of parents 
divided their estates exactly equally among their children, and 88 percent divided their estates 
approximately equally. Dunn and Phillips (1997) find that in the U.S. (1992), 90 percent of 
parents named all their children as beneficiaries in their wills, and that about 95 percent of these 
 
 
 2 
parents reported that the will “provides about equally” for all the children. In the second section 
of this paper we explain briefly why equal altruism toward children whose earnings differ is 
compatible with equal bequests. 
  
 The elimination of a degree of freedom with respect to the division of bequests places a 
heavier burden on inter-vivos transfers. With no recourse to compensating or counter-
compensating bequests, inter-vivos transfers become the means of choice to parents (who are 
equally altruistic toward their children) for affecting the differential earnings of their children. 
There is some evidence on the distribution of inter-vivos transfers across children. Cox (1987) 
and Cox and Rank (1992) find that, conditional on a positive transfer having occurred, inter-
vivos transfers increased as the income of the recipient increased. The finding is interpreted to 
be consistent with “an exchange motive” for transfers between parents and children but not with 
altruism. McGarry (1999) finds that the probability that parents made inter-vivos transfers to 
their children was related positively and significantly to the children’s level of schooling. This 
finding appears to be at odds with the altruism hypothesis: if schooling is a proxy for permanent 
income, the probability of a transfer ought to fall with increases in this variable. Altonji, 
Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992) test consumption and income data for the implicit presence of 
compensatory inter-vivos transfers among extended family members. If transfers are 
altruistically motivated, within-family consumption differences should be independent of the 
within-family distribution of income, but the evidence is to the contrary. Similarly, Altonji, 
Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1997) find only a modest effect from intergenerational altruism. 
Specifically, they test a general altruism hypothesis of inter-vivos transfers: a one-dollar 
increase in the income of parents who are actively engaged in transferring funds to a child 
coupled with a one-dollar reduction in that child’s income would result in a one-dollar increase 
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in the parents’ transfer to the child. Their findings reject the altruism hypothesis. Redistributing 
one dollar from a recipient child to the donor parents leads to less than a 13-cent increase in the 
parents’ inter-vivos transfer to the child. Somewhat surprisingly then, the available evidence 
does not provide strong support for the prediction that inter-vivos transfers are compensatory. In 
section 3 we show why this is so: altruistic parents who care equally about their children may 
well transfer more to the child whose earnings are higher. Rather than being orthogonal to 
parental altruism, counter-compensatory inter-vivos transfers emanate from parental altruism.  
 
2. The compatibility of equal bequests and parental altruism 
 Two characteristics sharply distinguish bequests from inter-vivos transfers: the public 
nature of bequests, and the finiteness of bequests as the last act of giving to children. For 
simplicity’s sake and without loss of generality we will refer henceforth to the case of two 
children. We let the earnings of child 1 be larger than the earnings of child 2.1 
 
 Parents who are equally altruistic toward their children may consider leaving a larger 
bequest to the lower-earning child 2 (a “compensating” act). However, because the division of 
bequests is public information, unequal division is tantamount to a public statement that child 
2’s earnings are relatively low – a declaration that can embarrass child 2. The finite nature of 
bequests renders them particularly symbolic and significant in the hearts and minds of children 
as an indicator of the strength of their parents’ love. Whereas any particular inter-vivos transfer 
can be followed by a compensating inter-vivos transfer, a bequest cannot. Child 1, who receives 
a smaller bequest than child 2, may sense neglect and betrayal and may suffer from envy and 
                                                 
 1 Behrman (1997) provides evidence that children typically differ in their earnings. 
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jealousy. While inter-vivos transfers can be made in complete secrecy (not even child 1, let 
alone outsiders, need know about a transfer that the parents make to child 2) bequests cannot be 
kept secret; sealed envelopes are distinct from a sealed will. Indeed, Stark (1998) has argued 
that a rationale for the equal division of bequests is the relative deprivation cost associated with 
unequal bequests. In general, children constitute a natural and quite cohesive reference group, 
and tend to engage in intragroup comparisons. These comparisons can give rise to 
dissatisfaction, dismay, and displeasure. Children refer differently to bequests and to income 
accruing to them separately from and independent of bequests. The very nature of the accrual of 
this income implies that when it comes to comparisons within the group of children, such 
income will be referred to differently than income arising from parental bequests. Relative 
deprivation will be induced if the parents bequeath to child 1 less than to child 2. As the bequest 
of child 2 increases relative to the bequest of child 1, child 1’s utility declines, as does the utility 
of the altruistic parents. Altruistic parents trade off this decline in utility against the advantage of 
providing a larger bequest to child 2. A high cost of relative deprivation prompts the parents to 
bequeath equally. 
 
3. Counter-compensatory inter-vivos transfers and parental altruism 
 We study inter-vivos transfers by parents who are equally altruistic toward their two 
children. Denote by Ti the parental transfer to child i, and by li the earnings capability of child i. 
Thus Ti generates earnings of. liTi .by child i. We consider first the case in which the earnings 
capabilities of the children differ: Child 1 whose earnings capability is higher converts transfers 
to more earnings than does child 2, l1 > l2 ³ 1. Child 1 attributes his relative success (l1/l2 >1) 
partially to his parents and expresses his gratitude by directing some reverse transfers to them. 
The sharing coefficient of child 1 with his parents is r > 0. The parents may find it optimal to 
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transfer more to child 1 than to child 2 since the reverse transfer may amount to more than child 
2 would have received. The parents can subsequently give this reverse transfer to child 2 who 
thus ends up better off. 
 
 While a direct parental transfer to child i is transformed by child i into earnings of liTi, 
any subsequent transfer to child i is not subject to such a transformation. We may conceive of 
the parental direct transfer Ti as taking place “at the beginning of the period,” of the 
transformation of Ti into liTi as “production during the period,” and of the usage by child 2 of 
l2T2 along with rl1T1 as his “consumption at the end of the period.” Notice that allowing 
“second round” transfers to child 2 to be subject to a l2 enhancement will only make our 
argument stronger. 
 
 Suppose that the parents decide to transfer an amount T of their income to their children. 
The parents may transfer T/2 to the lower-earning child 2. But they can improve on child 2’s 
outcome (which, if he were to receive T/2, would be l2T/2) by solving l2T2 + 1rl (T - T2) ³  
l2T/2. This gives the critical value2 
  
From the non-negativity of 
*T2  we get that r < l2 /.2l1 < 1/2. With no time discounting and no 
uncertainty, the parents improve child 2’s allocation by directly transferring to him less than half 
                                                 
 2 Detailed derivations of the mathematical results are in an appendix available from the authors upon request. 
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of the transfer amount. If r = 0, we get from the upper part of the equality in (1) that  
*T2  = T/.2, the scenario of an equal division of the transfer amount. Since 0 < 
T*2
r¶
¶
, the larger is 
the sharing coefficient of the higher-earning child, the more will the equally altruistic parents 
deviate from an equal transfer allocation. In addition, from a re-write of the upper part of the 
equality in (1) we get 
 
It follows that 0 < 
)/(
T
21
*
2
ll¶
¶
. We thus further infer that the larger the difference between the 
children’s earnings capabilities, the smaller the amount that the equally altruistic parents 
(initially) transfer to the lower-earning child. Finally, note that even if l1 = l2 (but r > 0), 
*T2   
is less than T/2.  
 
 While the magnitude of 
*T2  in (1) and the signs of r¶¶ /T
*
2  and )/(/T
*
212 ll¶¶  were 
not derived from an explicit utility maximization, such a maximization happens to give rise to 
precisely the same magnitude and signs. Let the parents’ utility function be  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1111121 21 TTV/TYVC,C,CU ppp rllaa -+--=  
    ( ) ( )112222 TTV/ rlla ++  (2) 
 
where Ci is consumption of i = p,1,2; 0 < 2/a < 1/2 is the weight the parents place on the 
felicity of each child relative to their own felicity; Vi is the direct pleasure of i from 
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consumption; pY  is the parents’ income; and T = T1 + T2 is the amount the parents transfer out 
of their income to the children such that T1 is transferred to child 1, and T2 is transferred to child 
2. We assume henceforth that Vi(Ci) = ln(Ci). The parents maximize their utility with respect to 
T, T1, and T2. This requires differentiating )(×U  with respect T1 and T2 (or with respect to T and 
T1, or with respect to T and T2). By equating the resulting derivatives to zero and then to each 
other we obtain optimal values of T1 and T2 (and hence of T). In particular, the optimal T2 is: 
 
which is exactly the expression in (1). 
 
 Typically, children differ not only in their capabilities to convert transfers into earnings 
but also in their pre-transfer earnings. How will parents who are equally altruistic toward their 
children divide the transfer amount between their children when both the difference in earnings 
and the difference in earnings-capability are considered? Will the parents still transfer to child 2 
less than T/2? 
 
 It is reasonable to assume that the difference in children’s earnings (incomes) correlates 
positively with the difference in their earnings capabilities. We therefore study the case in which 
the earnings of child 1, E1, are larger than the earnings of child 2, E2. The parents’ utility 
function is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11111121 21 TTEV/TYVC,C,CU ppp rllaa -++--=  
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From the first order condition of the utility maximization problem we get 
or 
 
It is instructive to check once again to see whether the optimal transfer to child 2 is less than 
T/2. Comparing 2T
~
 to T/2 gives that 2T
~
< T/2 if 
E
E < 
-
-
1
2
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lrl
. Assuming that E1/E2 = l1/l2 
gives that 2T
~
<T/.2 if 
2
1l  > l1/l2, which indeed holds. Inter-vivos transfers are still counter-
compensatory. 
 
 Suppose that E1 > E2, but that l1 = l2 = l; there is a difference in earnings not 
accompanied by a difference in earnings capabilities. From the equality in (4) the optimal T2 is 
now 
 
Is 2Tˆ < T/2.? It turns out that  T < 
E-E  
2
T
 < Tˆ 212
rl
 iff . Since this inequality holds for all 
sufficiently large T.’s, we conclude once again that counter-compensating inter-vivos transfers 
can arise. 
 Finally, we note that when r  = 0 and li=1, i=1,2, .T2 in (4) reduces to  
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Here T2 > T/.2 iff E1 > E2 and T2 = T/2 iff E1 = E2. Only in this special case are inter-vivos 
transfers (by parents who are equally altruistic toward their children) unequivocally 
compensatory. (This is the case alluded to by Becker and Tomes.) 
 
 Note that the sequence studied hitherto is not the only sequence that supports non-equal 
division of the transfer amount by parents who care for their children equally. If the higher-
earning child is altruistic toward the lower-earning child, the parents can again improve on child 
2’s outcome by solving l2T2 + r~ l1(T - T2) = l2T/.2 where r~  is the altruism coefficient of child 
1 toward child 2. The solution of this problem is identical to (1), and it likewise follows that the 
larger the altruism coefficient of child 1 toward child 2, and the larger the difference in the 
earnings capabilities of the two children, the larger the parents’ deviation from the equal 
division of the transfer.  
 
 In both schemes, parents who are equally altruistic toward their two children choose to 
transfer less to the child whose pre-transfer earnings and/or earnings capability are lower. Both 
schemes hinge on the gratitude or the altruism of child 1 and on transfers from that child. The 
two schemes differ though. In the first scheme the parents directly transfer less than half of the 
transfer amount to child 2. Yet, directly (as originators), and indirectly (as intermediaries), they 
end up transferring no less to child 2 than to child 1. In the second scheme, the parental transfer 
to child 2 is less than half the transfer amount. 
  
.  E - E  T   if            T   
 
 E - E > T   if   
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T
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 The two transfer schemes point to an additional relationship: the larger the difference in 
the earnings capabilities of the two children, the smaller the sharing coefficient ( r ) or the 
altruism coefficient ( r~ ) required to sustain the schemes. Re-arranging the upper part of the 
equality in (1) gives 
 
From (1'') we get that 0 < 
)/( 21 ll
r
¶
¶
; even a small sharing coefficient suffices to support 
counter-compensating inter-vivos transfers when the difference between the children’s earnings 
is large. If the likelihood of the existence of r  is inversely related to its magnitude, the 
likelihood of counter-compensatory inter-vivos transfers is larger, not smaller, when the 
difference between the children’s earnings capabilities is larger. An identical relationship holds 
for r~ , that is, 0 < 
)/(
~
21 ll
r
¶
¶
. 
4. Conclusions 
 The intersection of the standard altruism hypothesis with the quite strong evidence that 
bequests tend to be equal suggests that inter-vivos transfers should be strongly compensatory. 
Yet the available evidence is not in congruence with this implication. It has therefore been 
inferred that the motive underlying inter-vivos transfers is not parental altruism. This conclusion 
appears to be unwarranted: given equal bequests, there is no inherent contradiction between 
parental altruism and noncompensating inter-vivos transfers. In fact, parental altruism can well 
mandate inter-vivos transfers that are anything but compensatory. We argue that parents who are 
 .  1 < 
)T-T2(
T2-T 
/
1
 = 
*
2
*
2
21 ll
r  (1'') 
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equally altruistic toward their children will optimally transfer more to the child whose pre-
transfer earnings and/or earnings capability are higher. We refer to such transfer behavior as 
counter-compensatory, and demonstrate that rather than being orthogonal to parental altruism, 
noncompensating transfers emanate from such altruism. Moreover, an observation that larger 
parental transfers are made to the child whose earnings are higher cannot be construed as 
evidence in support of “exchange” as opposed to altruism. Such an observation may well 
underscore the role of altruism; altruistic parents rely on inter-sibling altruism. Our key point is 
that there is more to inter-vivos transfers than what the eye meets first. Parents and children are 
interlinked in a rich web of (vertical and possibly horizontal) transfers, reverse transfers, direct 
transfers, and indirect transfers. This multitude of transfers occurs over the entire lifetime of the 
parents and their children. Therefore, a proper test of parental altruism requires observations on 
lifetime longitudinal transfers between parents and their children as well as on transfers between 
the children. Currently available data sets do not appear to facilitate such encompassing 
observations. 
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